ch glaube der ICSID ist wahrscheinlich der erfolgversprechenste Weg, aber man muss wohl viel Zeit mitbringen und tiefe Taschen haben.....
Der erste Fall ist jetzt anhängig.....schaut euch mal den Zeitplan an.....
Poštová banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. Hellenic Republic
(ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8)
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3128_0.pdf
Mittwoch, 7. Mai 2014
Freitag, 23. November 2012
Exit Consents Killed in England? posted by Anna Gelpern
Exit Consents Killed in England?
The English High Court just ruled in Assenagon Asset Management S.A. v. Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Limited (formerly Anglo Irish Bank) that a popular technique used to pressure bondholders to participate in a debt restructuring, as deployed by Anglo Irish in late 2010, violated English law and the terms of the Trust Deed. I have not been able to find a link to the opinion yet, but there is some good reporting here and here, including links and block quotes. This is potentially huge for bank, sovereign, and all manner of other bond restructuring--plus competition among financial jurisdictions.
Exit consents are essentially votes by bondholders participating in a bond exchange to amend the old bonds on their way out, so as to make them unattractive to holdouts. The issuer typically asks participating holders to amend the old debt as part of the exchange offer. Knowing that exit consents are on the table makes creditors think twice before holding out: if participation is high enough for the exit vote to succeed, holdouts can see the value of their bonds evaporate, lose enforcement rights, or "merely" lose all liquidity in the remaining instruments. In the Anglo Irish case, non-participating sub debt was made subject to a call option at 1 cent on 1000 euros.
In 1986, the Delaware Chancery Court said in Katz v. Oak Industries Inc (508 A.2d 873) that exit consents were not a breach of good faith by the issuer. The English High Court said that they amount to an abuse of power by the majority, "oppressive and unfair" to the minority. Interestingly, it did not distinguish between the super-nasty exit consents of the sort used in Anglo Irish and the middling defensive sort used in the past by other debtors, such as Uruguay. The English court also ruled that the exiting votes should not have been counted because they were effectively cast on behalf of the debtor, Anglo Irish, and should have been ignored by the terms of the trust deed. Note that even though the English court ruled on grounds easily distinguishable from Katz, it made a point of parting ways with Katz.
Here is why this is a really big deal:
1. The exit consent technique is *pervasive*. Tons of past and imminent restructurings (think Spanish banks) are at stake. Contrary to press reports, however, Greece did not use exit consents in its English law bond exchange, so that is in the clear.
2. Particularly for sovereigns and banks, where there is no bankruptcy or bankruptcy/resolution is fraught with systemic consequences, this decision takes away a major source of flexibility (bondhoders might say abuse). Bail-in just got harder when it might matter the most.
3. The contours of inter-creditor good faith duties just got broader and fuzzier (see alsohere). The operation of good faith in bondholder votes going forward could be a challenge. This could have particularly big implications for widespread adoption and use of Collective Action Clauses.
4. Now there is another big incentive for bondholders to use English law. People are already paying attention, after Greece ran roughshod over its local law debt but ended up paying on some English law bonds. This is another, potentially more broadly applicable reason to come to London.
5.The decision shows courts can and do rule on principle, market and policy consequences be darned. I might be tempted to temper my views on the Second Circuit pari passu argument as a result.
This will certainly be appealed and tested broadly. So much for a quiet August and beyond.
Donnerstag, 8. November 2012
A People's History of Collective Action Clauses Mark C. Weidemaier
A People's History of Collective Action Clauses
Mark C. Weidemaier
University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - School of Law
G. Mitu Gulati
Duke University - School of Law
November 7, 2012
Abstract:
For two decades, collective action clauses (CACs) have been part of the official-sector response to sovereign debt crisis, justified by claims that these clauses can help prevent bailouts and shift the burden of restructuring onto the private sector. Reform efforts in the 1990s and 2000s focused on CACs. So do efforts in the Eurozone today. CACs have even been suggested as the cure for the US municipal bond market. But bonds without CACs are still issued in major markets, so reformers feel obliged to explain why they know better. Over time, a narrative has emerged to justify pro-CAC reforms. It relies on history and portrays CACs as novel solutions to previously-unappreciated coordination problems among bondholders.
But this pro-CAC narrative is based on flawed premises. In this article, we trace the use of CACs in sovereign bonds during the 20th century. We show that CACs have been used for much of that time, although often in forms (such as trustee and collective acceleration clauses) that are no longer central to modern reform debates (which focus on modification clauses). Market participants have long been aware of CACs but did not view them as a necessary part of sovereign bond documentation. Indeed, we recount one episode in which sovereign debt was restructured without anyone seeming to notice that the relevant debt already included CACs.
Contracts do not always include the optimal terms, and, at the margins, the sovereign debt markets might perform better if all bonds contained CACs. But if CACs are to be a central part of reform agendas, they should be defended on functional grounds rather than on contestable historical ones.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 47
Keywords: sovereign debt, collective action clauses, contracts, Eurozone
JEL Classification: f34,
working papers series
Date posted:
Suggested Citation
Dienstag, 30. Oktober 2012
um die “europaweite Einführung von Klauseln in die allgemeinen Bedingungen für Staatsanleihen, die eine Änderung der vereinbarten Leistung sowie die Rechte und Pflichten des Schuldners und der Gläubiger (Anleihebedingungen) durch Mehrheitsentscheidungen ermöglicht.”
Der Schuldenschnitt für Griechenland – unter Beteiligung von Freshfields-Anwälten als Berater des Bundesfinanzministeriums zustande gekommen.
Diener zweier Herren: Wie Großkanzleien die Bundesregierung in der Eurokrise beraten
geschrieben am 25.07.2012 um 14:44 in Lobbyismus, Transparenz von Martin Reyher
Er könne im Finanzministerium “nicht noch einen Experten für Kirschblütenbestäubung vorhalten”, sagte Peer Steinbrück einmal, weswegen er als Ressortchef regelmäßig externe Fachkräfte engagierte, und zwar nicht nur in Fragen der Kirschblütenbestäubung: In Sachen Bankenrettung beispielsweise entstand während Steinbrücks Amtszeit kaum ein Gesetzentwurf ohne die Mitwirkung außerministerieller Berater. Allein im Jahr 2008 summierten sich die Rechnungen des Finanzministeriums für Anwalts- und Beratungshonorare auf 12,5 Millionen Euro.
An der Lage hat sich seitdem wenig geändert. Es ist Krise, und zu deren Bewältigung vertraut auch die schwarz-gelbe Bundesregierung auf die Expertise hoch spezialisierter Fachleute aus der Privatwirtschaft. Aus einer Antwort der Bundesregierung an den CSU-Bundestagsabgeordneten Peter Gauweiler geht nun hervor, auf wessen Dienste die Regierung in der Eurokrise zurückgreift:
Die Bundesregierung hatte externen Sachverstand in Form von Gutachten, Studien oder sonstigen Beratungsleistungen … von der Firma Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer eingeholt,
schrieb Finanzstaatssekretär Steffen Kampeter am 18. Juni 2012 an den “sehr geehrten Kollegen” Gauweiler. Die internationale Großkanzlei habe ihre Expertise in das “sogenannte Gesamtpaket zur Sicherung der Finanzstabilität in der Eurozone” eingebracht. Konkret ging es laut Kampeter um die “europaweite Einführung von Klauseln in die allgemeinen Bedingungen für Staatsanleihen, die eine Änderung der vereinbarten Leistung sowie die Rechte und Pflichten des Schuldners und der Gläubiger (Anleihebedingungen) durch Mehrheitsentscheidungen ermöglicht.”
Beim vorläufigen Euro-Rettungsschirm EFSF und dem dauerhaften ESM ließ sich die Bundesregierung außerdem von der Kanzlei Hengeler Müller beraten, wie aus Kampeters Schreiben, das abgeordnetenwatch.de vorliegt, hervorgeht. Die Anwälte hätten an der “Dokumentation und Vorbereitung der Einsatzfähigkeit des Euro-Rettungsschirms” und bei der Änderung des EFSF-Rahmenvertrags mitgewirkt.
Über die Höhe der Beraterhonorare schweigt der Staatssekretär in seiner Antwort. Diese unterlägen dem Betriebs- und Geschäftsgeheimnis, eine “unbefugte Offenlegung eines Honorars” durch Amtsträger stehe unter Strafe. Selbstverständlich sei bei den Auftragsvergaben an Freshfields und Hengler Müller alles mit rechten Dingen zugegangen.
Insbesondere Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, mit rund 2.500 Anwälten eine der weltweit größten Wirtschaftskanzleien, ist so etwas wie der Haus- und Hofadvokat der Bundesregierung:
- Die Gesetzentwürfe und die Verordnung zum Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz – unter Finanzminister Steinbrück komplett von den Freshfields-Anwälten ausgearbeitet.
- Der Schuldenschnitt für Griechenland – unter Beteiligung von Freshfields-Anwälten als Berater des Bundesfinanzministeriums zustande gekommen.
- Der Sonderfonds Finanzmarktstabilisierung (SoFFin) – maßgeblich von Freshfields beraten.
- Die dem Finanzministerium unterstellte Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) – bei den Griechenland-Hilfen juristisch von Freshfields vertreten.
Donnerstag, 17. Mai 2012
Economic and Financial Committee and Financial Committee > Sub-Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets > Cac > CAC 2012
On-going work on CACs 2012
Following up to the conclusions of the European Council of 24/25 March 2011, a standardized and identical collective action clause (CAC) 
[66 KB] , including supplemental provisions [52 KB] , has been developed and agreed by the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) on 18November 2011.
[66 KB] , including supplemental provisions [52 KB] , has been developed and agreed by the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) on 18November 2011.
In
accordance with Paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the ESM Treaty, the model
CAC will become mandatory in all new euro area government securities
with maturity above one year issued on or after 1 January 2013, and not 1
July 2013, as previously contemplated.
Its
introduction will not affect any euro area government securities issued
prior to that date unless those securities include a collective action
clause that allows for their modification on a cross-series basis on the
terms contemplated in the model CAC. As a result and except as just
noted, euro area government securities issued prior to 1 January 2013
will not be subject to modification as part of a cross-series
modification pursuant to the model CAC.
The Economic
and Financial Committee has agreed on a schedule for the ESDM to
monitor Member States' progress in implementing the model CAC, with a
view to its timely introduction in all euro area government securities
issued after 31 December 2012.
The ESDM expects to publish a report on the implementation of the model CAC prior to January 2013.
Explanatory notes
ein erster Lesevorschlag: Collective Action Clauses for the Eurozone: An Empirical Analysis
Abstract
Among the policy initiatives designed to tackle the current sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone is a requirement that all Eurozone sovereign bonds issued after January 1, 2013 include a set of new contract provisions. These provisions, referred to as Collective Action Clauses or CACs, are intended to enable an orderly restructuring of distressed sovereign debt, thereby reducing the need for third-party bailouts. However, making restructurings easier and cheaper could potentially increase the propensity of governments to borrow irresponsibly. A concern about the new CACs, therefore, is that they will result in increased borrowing costs, particularly for sovereigns in the weakest financial condition. By examining the historical relation between CACs and yields on bonds written under New York and English law, we attempt to shed light on what would be the effect of including CACs in Eurozone sovereign bonds. Contrary to previous research and common belief, we find little evidence that CACs increase the cost of capital. Moreover we find that the reduction in yields is larger for the sovereigns that are in the weakest financial condition.
Collective Action Clauses for the Eurozone:
An Empirical Analysis
Michael Bradley & Mitu Gulati1
Third Draft
May 7, 2012
Among the policy initiatives designed to tackle the current sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone is a requirement that all Eurozone sovereign bonds issued after January 1, 2013 include a set of new contract provisions. These provisions, referred to as Collective Action Clauses or CACs, are intended to enable an orderly restructuring of distressed sovereign debt, thereby reducing the need for third-party bailouts. However, making restructurings easier and cheaper could potentially increase the propensity of governments to borrow irresponsibly. A concern about the new CACs, therefore, is that they will result in increased borrowing costs, particularly for sovereigns in the weakest financial condition. By examining the historical relation between CACs and yields on bonds written under New York and English law, we attempt to shed light on what would be the effect of including CACs in Eurozone sovereign bonds. Contrary to previous research and common belief, we find little evidence that CACs increase the cost of capital. Moreover we find that the reduction in yields is larger for the sovereigns that are in the weakest financial condition.
Collective Action Clauses for the Eurozone:
An Empirical Analysis
Michael Bradley & Mitu Gulati1
Third Draft
May 7, 2012
Geldmuseum (Bundesbank) Vortrag: "Verwendung von Collective Action Clauses bei der Restrukturierung von Staatsschulden im Euroraum. Was steckt dahinter?"
- http://www.geldmuseum.de/veranstaltungen/veranstaltungen_museumsabend.php
- "Verwendung von Collective Action Clauses bei der Restrukturierung von Staatsschulden im Euroraum. Was steckt dahinter?"
PD Dr. Christian Hofmann
Mittwoch, 9. Mai 2012, 18 Uhr
Hofmann war verhindert, so wurde der Vortrag von RAin Dr. Annabella Kolling (BuBa) gehalten.
Vorträge in 2012
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